[sugar] key IDs
Thu May 31 10:40:31 EDT 2007
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On Thu, 31 May 2007 at 10:45:02 +0200, Morgan Collett wrote:
> Simon McVittie wrote:
> > I'm assuming here that the key-ID is "sufficiently unique" across all
> > trusted servers. It's a SHA-1 of the public key, so basically the
> > same strength as GnuPG key fingerprints and git object hashes.
> > (Actually, for hysterical raisins, it's a SHA-1 of Base64(public_key) -
> > we should probably change this before we ship.)
> A lot of crypto out there relies on hashes of keys. If the key is random
> (enough), then the hash should be good enough not to collide. At least,
> not in predictable ways...
Sure. If there's a collision, you may be able to do a minor DoS
by setting up two XOs with keys with the same key-ID - this will confuse
the PS on other XOs, but shouldn't be serious (the worst case is that
you can see that one or other of the colliding XOs is in an activity,
but you can't see which is there, or indeed whether it's both).
(Hmm, actually... in the current implementation, if one of the colliding XOs
is in an activity, and it leaves, then the PS (and hence UI) will
indicate that the "collided" Buddy has left, which may enable the other
colliding XO to eavesdrop undetected. I can fix this quite easily, though,
and will do so.)
Impersonating another child would require a preimage attack, as I understand it
(i.e. the ability to construct a key with a desired hash). It seems
reasonable that we don't defend against preimage attacks.
> Why though is it a hash of the base64? In theory the base64s have the
> same entropy as the keys, but the crypto stuff should be happening in
> binary land unless we get into XML.
Like I said, hysterical raisins (aka "it was like that when I got
The public key is represented in Telepathy by a byte-array (i.e. binary
blob) and our assumption was always that the OLPC people would put raw
key material into it. However, the presence service always appears to
pass keys around as Base64 strings, which are the contents of owner.key.pub
(which is an OpenSSH DSA public key in the same form you'd put in your
~/.ssh/authorized_keys) minus the "ssh-dss " prefix.
I think the PS should pass keys around as a binary blob of raw key material,
and the SHA-1 should be over this raw key material.
> If changing it will break the mesh for everybody at some point "before
> we ship", sooner's better than later.
> In http://www.nist.gov/sha, NIST states:
> "Federal agencies should stop using SHA-1 for digital signatures,
> digital time stamping and other applications that require collision
> resistance as soon as practical, and must use the SHA-2 family of hash
> functions for these applications after 2010."
> We probably won't have a NIST-blessed replacement for SHA before 2012.
> Nevertheless, we need to allow for changes along the way.
Hmm. I hadn't thought about having a changeable key algorithm...
> > The actual function used for the key-ID can be changed (if it
> > is, old and new versions of Sugar will be incompatible, but that's not
> > really a problem yet) so if any crypto gurus want to specify something
> > different, now would be a really good time. As currently implemented, its
> > output must be short enough to put in the JID (for which a hex SHA-1 is
> > somewhat long already).
> IMO we need to allow for some algorithm agility here. Breaking the mesh
> at any stage is going to be very unpleasant - for the users^Wkids
> For the unique identifier stuff, could we at some future point do a
> 'keyid2/' (or some other prefix) meaning that this is an identifier in a
> different space?
OK, here's a proposal:
* The generated JIDs have a prefix ending with a dot, which is the algorithm
by which they were generated.
* No prefix means hex(SHA-1(Base64(key material))) as we currently do.
This is deprecated and support will be removed before we ship.
* We define a prefix to switch to now, perhaps "sha1." meaning
hex(SHA1(key material)). We could consider switching from hex to Base32
(which would give us JIDs half as long for the same hash length), or to a
stronger hash algorithm, straight away. The Base32 pad character would have
to be changed from "=" to "_" to be valid in both JIDs and object-paths, but
that's easy. Base64 is unsuitable since the user part of a JID is
* Everything else containing a dot is reserved for future expansion.
* The object ID inside PS is one of xmpp/some.jid at example.com (as
currently, used for "foreign" and unidentifiable buddies),
keyid/hexhexhexhex (for an unprefixed key, deprecated), or
keyid/prefix/whateverwhatever (for a key with that prefix, e.g.
* When coalescing contacts into buddy objects we assume the buddy will
rarely be visible on more than one server at the same time with different
key-hash algorithms, so continue to treat the key-hash as a unique ID.
The failure mode if this assumption fails is that there might be two
Buddy objects in the mesh representing the same person, but the PS as it
exists at the moment will never cause this (it only ever connects to
one server at a time), so I don't think we need to care.
* When we discover a buddy's full key, we hash it repeatedly, and add
their Buddy object to the dict PresenceService._buddies once per known
hash/encoding algorithm. Note that on Salut (link-local) we expect to either
have someone's full key, or discover that they don't have a key, before we
can interact with them at all.
* The server component that does the key-based authentication (which
we haven't written yet) always has to be upgraded earlier than the XOs are,
so it will let new XOs register with new hash/encoding algorithms.
* After the XO registers on the server, instead of storing a boolean
"registered", it stores the JID it used. In future, it'll always log
in with that JID.
* Should there be a process by which XOs whose JIDs use a weak hash try to
upgrade to a better hash, by creating a new account? If so, we can avoid
the "two Buddies" issue by making sure we log out of the old account
before attempting to create the new one; if creation fails we can log
back in as the old account.
* When looking up a buddy by complete public key, we try all
non-obsolete hash/encoding algorithms (so there's value in keeping the
number supported as small as possible).
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